The circumstances under which the shapes of figure versus ground regions are perceived and remembered were investigated in three experiments that replicate, extend, and clarify Rubin's (1921) classic study on this topic. In Experiment 1, observers reported which of two regions they perceived as figure within ambiguous, bipartite, 2-D displays. In a later shape recognition test, the shapes of regions previously seen as figures were remembered well, but the shapes of regions previously seen as grounds were remembered no better than novel distracter regions. Experiment 2 examined the same question about memory for the shape of figure versus ground regions in nested displays in which the central region could be perceived either as a closer figure surrounded by a farther ground (i.e., as a solid object) or as a farther ground surrounded by a closer figure (i.e., as an empty hole). Unlike Experiment 1, the shapes of regions initially perceived as grounds (holes) were remembered as well as those of regions initially perceived as figures (solid objects), and much better than those of novel distracter regions.
In 1921 Edgar Rubin famously described the phenomenon of figure-ground organization, a concept that has since become a cornerstone in the field of visual perception. Figure-ground organization takes place when an observer views two adjacent regions separated by a single, shared contour as surfaces at different depths with one surface partly occluding the other.
1 This phenomenon is classically discussed in terms of two conceptually distinct results: a relative depth effect and figural shape effect.
The relative depth effect refers to the fact that the figural side appears closer than the ground side, with the shared contour constituting a depth edge. 2 The figural shape effect refers to the fact that the contour appears to impart shape to the figure, but not to the ground, which appears to extend "shapelessly" behind the figure. Figure 1A illustrates these effects in an ambiguous, bipartite display due to Rubin (1921) , in which either the black or the white region can be perceived as figure. When the black region is seen as figure, it is perceived as closer and shaped like pointed claws (see Figure 1B ) with the white ground region extending unshaped behind them. In contrast, when the white region is seen as figure, it is perceived as closer and shaped like rounded fingers (see Figure 1C ) with the black ground region extending unshaped behind them.
-------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here -------------------------------------------------------
It is important to realize that although the relative depth and figural shape aspects of figureground organization may seem to be logically independent, they are codetermined by ecological regularities in the interaction between light and opaque surfaces in the physical environment. When 3D scenes of opaque objects are optically projected onto a 2D surface, such as the retina, depth edges in the image do, in fact, "belong" to the region corresponding to the side closer to the observer. Moreover, they do, in fact, carry information about the shape of the object on the closer side (i.e., the borders of that material's distribution in space) and not on the farther side. These two aspects of figure-ground organization are thus completely correlated for 2D optical images of opaque objects. Because most terrestrial objects are largely opaque, it is reasonable to postulate a unitary perceptual process --often called "contour assignment" or "border ownership" --that explains both aspects of figure-ground perception: The edge, border, or contour is assigned unidirectionally to only one side, according to the well-known factors of figure-ground organization, such as surroundedness, symmetry, size, contrast, orientation (Rubin, 1921) , convexity (Kanizsa & Gerbino, 1976) , familiarity (Peterson & Gibson, 1994) , lower region (Vecera, Vogel, and Woodman, 2002) , top-bottom polarity (Hulleman & Humphreys, 2004) , and edge-texture grouping (Palmer & Brooks, in press ). The result is that relative depth and figural shape are always linked such that the figural side is perceived as both closer to the observer and shaped by the shared contour. Figure- ground organization can thus be understood as the perceptual embodiment of these powerful constraints in the visual system's attempt to recover information about the layout of environmental surfaces.
The present article addresses a seeming paradox in this important relation between depth and shape in figure-ground organization for the case of 2D visual holes. 3 The paradox is that holes seem to dissociate the otherwise ironclad connection between relative depth and figural shape (cf. Palmer, 1999, p. 268-269; Peterson, 2003) . In particular, we present compelling evidence that people perceive and remember the shapes of intrinsic visual holes: The outer region is perceived as closer, yet the shape of the inner region appears to be perceived and remembered 4 . The results therefore have potentially important implications for the assumption that a single process of edge assignment is sufficient to explain both relative depth and figural shape.
For the purposes of this paper, a 2D visual hole is defined as a closed image contour, every point of which is the projection of an environmental point that is closer to the observer than the projection of its adjacent interior point. 5 The depth conditions for a 2D visual hole are thus clear and unequivocal: They literally define the concept. An intrinsic visual hole is a visual hole whose bounding contour is the projection of a continuous physical edge, with no discontinuities in depth. 6 The critical question is whether people perceive the shape of an intrinsic visual hole as being the same as that of its solid complement (i.e., the solid surface that would exactly fill the hole). 7 If so, the shape of the hole would be perceived with respect to the side of the contour that is farther from the viewer (the inner side) rather than the side that is closer (the outer side), thus appearing to contradict the classical dual-function assumption of border assignment. Figure 2 shows some simple but intuitively compelling examples of holes whose shapes appear to be perceived as the same as that of their solid complements. When these images are seen as black squares containing holes, as they are very likely to be under the conditions in Figure 2 (see Nelson & Palmer, 2001 , for studies of some of the relevant factors), the shapes of the holes are perceived as circular (Figure 2A ), head-shaped ( Figure 2B ), and that of a particular, novel, three-lobed shape ( Figure 2C ).
These shapes are perceived even though the inner contours are clearly assigned outward for purposes of depth perception in each case. If the shape imparted by the contour between the two regions were necessarily assigned in the same direction as the closer surface, as they are in classical, bipartite figureground demonstrations that do not involve holes (see Figure 1A ), then the shape of the inner regions should not be perceived. Inspection of Figure 2 clearly suggests that they are, however. There are several other phenomenological demonstrations in the literature that support the same or similar claims that the shapes of holes are indeed perceived as the same as or quite similar to those of their solid complements (e.g., Palmer, 1999; Peterson, 2003; Subirana-Vilanova & Richards, 1996; Casati & Varzi, 1994) . Moreover, perceiving the shapes of holes is a relatively commonplace visual skill, mastered at an early age by small children who manage to pick the appropriately shaped peg to pound into a given shape of hole and to see the letters in stencil cutouts. This introspective evidence is so compelling that it might seem disingenuous to suggest that people do not perceive the shapes of visual holes, but the question is an empirical one. What do the data tell us?
Surprisingly, the bulk of the published empirical evidence appears to go against the conclusion that people perceive the shapes of visual holes. The first relevant data of this sort come from Rubin's (1921) classic experiment on visual memory for figures versus grounds. (We preface the following discussion with the caveat that Rubin himself neither presented nor interpreted his results in terms of the perception of or memory for the shapes of holes, but in terms for the memory for figures versus grounds --but we believe they are nevertheless relevant to the present issue.) In the initial learning phase of the experiment, Rubin showed observers novel displays containing two nested regions (see Figure 3 ) and explicitly instructed them to perceive either the inner region or the outer region as the closer, figural surface. When the inner region is perceived as figure, it is seen as a solid object against a partly occluded background surface. When the outer region is perceived as figure, the inner region is consistent with perception as a hole in the surrounding surface through which part of the ground surface is visible.
Later, in the recognition phase of the experiment, Rubin's observers were shown the same displays, together with some new distracter displays of similar composition. Once again, they were instructed to perceive either the inner or the outer region as figure, and then they were asked to decide whether that region had been presented in the learning phase or not. Rubin compared the observers' recognition memory when they received the same figural instructions (to see either the inner or outer region as figure) in the learning and recognition phases versus when they received different instructions in the two phases. He reported that recognition occurred much more frequently when observers were told to organize the test display in the same way as in their initial instructions (49%) than when they were instructed to organize them in the opposite way (9%) or when they had never seen the display before (6%). He therefore concluded that people do not perceive the shape of the region seen as ground. Given that the regions he studied were nested, this conclusion implies that his subjects did not perceive or remember the shapes of intrinsic holes when they saw the surrounding region as figural.
There are other more recent findings on purely perceptual tasks that have also been interpreted as consistent with the claim that people do not perceive the interior shapes of holes. Bertamini and Croucher (2003) and Bertamini and Mosca (2004) studied how long it took observers to make a particular shape-related discrimination and found that holes produced different results from their solid complements. In particular, they showed observers hexagons with horizontal tops and bottoms whose left and right sides were either both convex angles (a "barrel" shape) or both concave angles (an "hourglass" shape). When observers viewed the barrel shape, they were faster in responding to the objects than the holes, but when they viewed the hourglass shape, they were faster on the holes than the objects. When considered in terms of material convexities and concavities, the results are consistent: observers were faster for both the barrel and the hourglass shapes when the vertices they were judging were material convexities than when they were material concavities. The differences in response times between objects and holes of the same shape were generally quite small (5-10 ms), but the authors interpreted the pattern of results as implying that the interior shapes of holes are not perceived.
Using a very different paradigm, Hulleman and Humphreys (2005) reported evidence implying that the shapes of holes are not perceived as rapidly as the shapes of objects. They studied visual search times for specific shapes that were presented as the interiors of holes versus their solid complements and found that, all else being equal (a condition not easily achieved), observers searched more rapidly for object shapes than for correspondingly shaped holes. If the shapes of holes were perceived as rapidly as the shapes of objects, no such difference should have been evident.
As interesting as these more recent results are, they are questionable as evidence against perception of the interior shapes of holes. It may well be that it is more difficult to perceive the shapes of holes than the shapes of their solid complements and that it takes more time to do so. If this were the case, visual search for holes would take longer, as Hulleman and Humphreys (2005) reported. That fact alone cannot be construed as evidence that people fail to perceive the shapes of holes, however. Indeed, it is not obvious how Hulleman and Humphreys' observers could have performed their task unless they somehow managed to perceive the shapes of the holes, because that was what they were instructed to search for. It also seems plausible that there may be some tasks that do not require constructing a global shape description of a hole-bearing object, depending primarily or exclusively on the position of material concavities and convexities, as those studied by Bertamini and his colleagues (Bertamini & Croucher, 2003; Bertamini & Mosca, 2004) . We will later propose that the process of constructing a description of the shape of a hole occurs after an initial process of designating local material convexities and concavities. If Bertamini's task can be performed strictly on local material convexities and concavities, as appears to be the case, then it is understandable that their results would not reflect the perceived shape of the entire hole, because perceiving the shape of the entire hole is not required for the task.
If people do perceive the inner shapes of holes, however, Rubin's memory experiment should not have shown figure-ground effects he reported. Unlike Hulleman and Humphreys' task, Rubin's task was not speeded, and, unlike Bertamini's task, it depended on global shape. If people perceive the shapes of holes in terms of the shapes of their interior regions, as we believe, it should not have mattered whether his observers perceived the inner region as a hole or as an object. In both cases, the shape of the interior region should have been encoded and remembered. In Rubin's "inward" instructional condition, it should have been remembered as the shape of an object on a ground and in his "outward" instructional condition, it should have been remembered as the shape of an intrinsic hole. Memory performance in
Rubin's experiment thus should have been essentially the same in both cases.
Given the compelling demonstrations in Figure 2 and commonplace everyday experience in perceiving the shapes of holes, we were skeptical that Rubin could have obtained the results he reported unless one or more confounding factors were at work. The present experiments constitute our attempts to clarify and extend Rubin's findings about the memorability of shape in figure-ground perception. Our first experiment measured shape memory for truly ambiguous bipartite figure-ground displays that do not contain holes (see Figure 1 ) in a methodologically improved replication of Rubin's original study. Its results corroborate Rubin's conclusion --that the shapes of grounds are not remembered -at least for ambiguous bipartite displays that do not contain holes. Consistent with Rubin's theoretical framework that the shape of a ground region is not perceived and therefore not remembered, we found that memory for ground shapes was no better than that for new distracter shapes of similar construction that had never been seen before.
Rubin's actual experiment used nested displays (see Figure 3) , however, and its results imply that his observers did not perceive or remember the inner shapes of holes when they were told to perceive the outer region as figure. This finding is thus contrary to our intuitions concerning the perception of hole shape in Figure 2 , which implies that memory for the shape of the ground region within intrinsic holes should be good. A closer reading of Rubin's study revealed several potential concerns about his methods. The first concerns his observers. Contrary to modern standards of good experimental procedure, his observers may have been aware of his experimental hypothesis in an experiment for which intentions could have strong effects on the results. The second is that there was apparently no exposure time limit in either the study or test phases. This raises the possibility that the observers may have seen multiple interpretations of the same display at either the initial presentation and/or the memory test. A third concern is the complexity of Rubin's inner regions, many of which had large portions of their inner contour that were convex (rather than concave) toward the inside. We suspect that this may have allowed Rubin's observers to parse the exterior region into pieces whose shapes they could perceive and remember as figural in a way that is not representative of simpler nested shapes.
In Experiment 2 we therefore replicated Rubin's "holes" experiment with several modifications designed to avoid these problems. First, we used a much larger number of observers, all of whom were naïve to our hypotheses. Second, we used learning conditions similar to Rubin's, with instructions to see the inner or outer region as figure, but changed the test conditions by (a) showing only the inner shape, (b) instructing observers to perceive them as figures, rather than holes, and (c) displaying the test figure for only one second so that observers were less likely to reverse the figure-ground organization, even if they tried. Third, we used simpler nested regions that had few extended portions that were convex toward the inside (see Figure 4) . We expected that under these conditions we would fail to find the difference Rubin reported between the inside-and outside-directed figure-ground instructions, consistent with our belief that people perceive the shapes of holes to be the same as those of their solid complements in a recognition memory task. This was, in fact, what we found. In Experiment 3 we replicated and extended the results of Experiment 2 by showing that these differences are not due to observers failing to follow the figural instructions, because the same results were obtained when they viewed unambiguous 3D displays binocularly, thus eliminating the need for any figural instructions at all. We again found that memory for the shapes of ground regions visible through surrounding holes was no worse than memory for the shapes of the same regions when they were presented as solid figures, again supporting our contention that people perceive and remember the shapes of intrinsic holes.
Experiment 1: Memory for Figures and Grounds in Bipartite Displays
The first critical issue we address is whether Rubin's original hypothesis is, in fact, correct for non-nested displays: Is the shape of a region seen as ground remembered more poorly than the shapes of the same region when seen as a figure? Given the difficulty of perceiving the outer region of Rubin's nested displays as figures and the inner region of his displays as ground, a better test of his central hypothesis would contrast memory for figures versus grounds in more truly ambiguous bipartite displays, such as the one shown in Figure 1 . Experiment 1 tested this hypothesis using methods that improved on his experiment in several additional ways. First, naïve observers were used who had no knowledge of the experimental hypothesis. Second, we did not rely on the observer's ability to follow instructions about which region to perceive as figure. Rather each observer reported on every learning trial the color of the region he or she saw as the figure, and memory performance for that observer was conditionalized on that region having been seen as figural. Third, we showed the ambiguous learning displays for just 1 second each to minimize the chances that observers would see them in more than one figure-ground organization. And fourth, we made each memory test display as unambiguous as possible by showing them only as a single surrounded region on a large background for just 1 second, both to maximize the probability that the surrounded region would be perceived as figure and to minimize the possibility that it could be reorganized as ground during the test. Under these conditions, we expected the results to support Rubin's hypothesis that the shapes of regions seen as figural would be remembered better than either the shapes of regions seen initially as grounds or the shapes of new test regions (distracters) similar to those of the originally presented regions.
Method
Observers. Twenty-three students in Introductory Psychology classes at Rutgers University and Somerset County College participated in the experiment, none of whom had any knowledge of the experimental hypothesis.
Materials. Six 2" x 2" color slides were prepared for the initial learning phase of the experiment each of which contained a bipartite display. In three slides, both regions were novel in shape and in the other three slides one of the regions was familiar (e.g., a face in profile). The colors of the displays were either blue-and-yellow, red-and-green, or black-and-white, and were counterbalanced across observers so that each shape appeared in both colors of a pair an equal number of times.
Twelve achromatic slides were prepared for the recognition test phase, each of which contained one of the twelve regions in the bipartite displays. All figures were light gray and were surrounded by a dark gray background. Seven additional achromatic test slides were prepared in a similar manner, except that the shapes depicted had not been presented during the learning phase. These slides constituted distracters that were used to estimate the false-positive rate. Three shapes were familiar (e.g., a cup) and four were novel, two with an irregular contour on the left and two with an irregular contour on the right.
Procedure. Observers sat in the front of a large classroom with a clear view of the projector screen on which the displays were shown. In the initial learning phase of the experiment, they were instructed to report the color of the region they perceived as "the shape" presented on that trial by writing on a separate line of a single response sheet. No mention was made of figure-ground organization or shape ambiguity because we wanted to minimize the possibility of the displays being seen in more than one organization. Two examples of the kind of displays the observers would see were then presented. Each slide in this learning phase was presented for 1 second each.
In the recognition phase, observers were instructed to decide whether the shape of the single region presented on a given test slide was the same as one that had been presented in the learning phase of the experiment. They were told to write "yes" on the response sheet if it was and "no" if it was not.
Each of the achromatic test slides was then presented for 1 second, followed by a 10 second interval during which observers made their responses.
Results and Discussion
The recognition data were scored contingent on the reported figural status of the test shape in the initial learning phase: i.e., the probability of a positive (recognized) response for regions originally perceived as figure, for regions originally perceived as ground, and for regions not previously presented (see Figure 5 ). The probability of shape recognition for regions previously perceived as figures was .88
(.84 for novel regions and .93 for familiar ones), significantly higher than the probability of shape recognition for regions previously seen as grounds, which was .18 (.20 for novel regions and .16 for familiar regions), p < .001 by a binomial test. The false-positive rate for the distracter shapes was .17, also significantly lower than the recognition rate figural regions (p < .001) but not significantly different from that for ground regions. The results thus provide strong support for Rubin's hypothesis that the shapes of figural regions are remembered better than those for ground regions, at least for displays in which the two regions are not nested.
Experiment 2: Memory for Figures and Grounds in Nested Displays
In the second experiment, we used methods similar to those of Experiment 1 to test the extension of this conclusion to nested displays, which were the type originally used by Rubin (1921) . We constructed experimental displays like the ones shown in Figure 4 . They are similar to Rubin's displays in that they consisted of a green central region fully enclosed by a black surrounding region, but different in that they were somewhat simpler, with fewer and less extreme indentations and convolutions. We followed Rubin's procedure during the learning phase of the experiment by instructing observers to perceive some of the displays as a green object against a black background surface (the "inside" or "object" condition) and others as a black object with a hole in the center that revealed a green background surface behind it (the "outside" or "hole" condition). We departed from Rubin's learning procedure, however, in using a large number of naïve observers and by showing the initial displays for a limited period of time (1 second) to reduce the likelihood that they would perceive more than one organization for any given display. The display time in the present experiment was longer than the 1 second used in Experiment 1 because we expected observers to take longer to organize the nested displays as instructed in the outside (hole) condition.
We also departed from Rubin's procedure in the recognition phase. He tested "old" and "new" stimulus displays for recognition memory by giving either the same or reversed figure-ground instructions to the previously presented displays and found lower recognition in the reversed-instruction condition than in the same-instruction condition. We worried that such instructions might lead observers to respond "new" even if they remembered the shape of a test region quite well, but thought that it had been presented with different figural instructions in the learning phase, a possibility that would explain the results he reported without implying that they did not remember the shapes of the holes. Instead, we followed the procedure of Experiment 1 by instructing observers to organize all the test displays as central green objects against black surrounding backgrounds. We also showed the test figures for only 1 second each to reduce the likelihood that observers would have time to reorganize them as holes. If they were successful in perceiving the initial displays in the learning phase as they had been instructed, and if Rubin's hypothesis that the shapes of ground regions are not remembered were correct, then recognition memory for the initial displays in the outside (or "hole") condition should be poor, as it was in Experiment 1, because the central regions should have been remembered as shapeless grounds. However, if the displays in the outside condition of the learning phase were perceived as holes whose shapes correspond to that of their interior regions, as we expect, then observers should recognize both the inside (object) and outside (hole) learning displays equally well in the recognition test. Thus, we predict that, unlike Experiment 1, both inside and outside displays should be remembered much better than distracters, but there should be no difference between the inside and outside instructional conditions.
Method
Observers. Eighteen students from the University of California, Berkeley, volunteered to participate in a brief experiment for the reward of a candy bar.
Materials. All displays were presented on a computer monitor. Each consisted of a 6.3 cm x 6.3 cm black square within which was a novelly shaped, green interior region. From the observers' viewpoint at 52 cm from the screen, the squares subtended about 7 degrees of visual angle. Sixteen such displays were constructed, eight of which were presented in both the learning and test phases (the "old" displays) and the remaining eight of which were distracters presented only in the test phase (the "new" displays). Thus, 50% of the recognition items were "old" and 50% "new." The displays were counterbalanced over old versus new conditions. Procedure. Before the trial began, observers were given a brief description of figure-ground patterns, including Rubin's (1921) well-known vase/faces figure. They were then shown a novel bipartite display with a divided contour in order to demonstrate how assigning the dividing contour to one side or the other gave rise to different shape perceptions. Then they were shown a display similar to the ones they would later see in the experiment and were instructed as follows:
"I am going to show you a series of figures that look like this. This figure, and all the others I will show you, can be seen in either of two ways. You can see the central green region as the figure, the thing that has a certain shape. Or you can see the surrounding black region as the figure or "thing," in which case the central green region becomes the background as seen through a hole, and the surrounding region has the shape. It is more difficult to see the black region as figure, so to make it easier, we have surrounded the black square with green in this demonstration, so that the green inside the borders of the black region can be seen as the same background as the green outside the black region. However, in the experiment itself, the green will only be inside the square. 
Results
Recognition memory for the shapes of previously seen regions was substantial, but did not differ reliably as a function of the figural instructions in the learning phase. Of the four displays organized as green objects against a black ground in the learning phase (the inside condition in which the figural region was tested), 90% of the old test displays were correctly recognized (see Figure 5 ). Of the four displays organized as black figures containing holes in the learning phase (the outside condition in which the ground region was tested), 86% of the old test displays were correctly recognized, even though observers were instructed to view them in the test phase as central green figures, opposite to their instructions during initial learning phase. This small difference is not statistically significant (t(17) < 1).
Only 14% of the new displays were falsely recognized, leading to d' values of 2.36 for the inside condition and 2.16 for the outside condition. In both cases, memory performance was quite good and much better than chance.
Note that these findings are contrary to Rubin's results in that we found no evidence that initial figural instructions influenced later recognition performance. Our preferred interpretation is that when the contour is assigned outward to the surrounding region, observers nevertheless perceive the central region as an intrinsic hole whose shape is encoded and remembered. Several other interpretations are possible, however. One is that, despite the different figural instructions during the learning phase, observers always perceived the central region as the figure and therefore recognized all old test figures equally well. A less likely possibility is that, despite the instructions during the test phase always to perceive the central region as the figure, observers may have perceived the surrounding region as figural in the outward displays from the learning phase. The third experiment was designed to rule out such explanations in terms of instructional failures by presenting observers with unambiguous displays consisting of real surfaces and real holes located in different depth planes at distances for which binocular disparity cues are robust and unequivocal and no figural instructions are required.
Experiment 3: Memory for Shapes of Objects and Holes in Depth
We were concerned that observers in Experiment 2 might have might sometimes not have been able to follow the instructions to perceive the ambiguous figure/ground displays as requested during the learning and/or test phase of Experiment 2 or that, even if they managed to succeed, the difficulty of carrying them out might have influenced their memory. We therefore repeated the experiment with unambiguous depth displays made of cardboard cutouts that eliminated the need for any figure-ground instructions whatsoever. We made the central region unambiguously figural by presenting a green piece of cardboard in the shape of the central figure in front of a black square card. We made the outer region unambiguously figural by cutting a hole out of a black square card in the shape of the central region and then presenting this shape in front of a green background. Because the displays were viewed well within the range of stereoscopic depth perception, all observers should have perceived the intended figure/ground organization quite clearly. These conditions effectively rule out the possibilities that observers either sometimes fail to perceive the organization as instructed or have great difficulty in doing so, because no instructions were needed or given; observers simply perceived the relative depth and figural shape information that was present in the display. The question was whether they would remember the shapes of the holes under these unambiguous circumstances, as we expect, or whether they would fail to remember them, consistent with the hypothesis that people do not perceive or remember the shapes of holes.
Method
Observers. Eighteen students at the University of California, Berkeley, volunteered to participate in a brief experiment for the reward of a candy bar.
Materials. All figures in the learning phase were presented at a distance of 52 cm from the observers. The black surrounding figures with holes in the center were presented at a distance of 20 cm in front of a green background with randomly placed black dots. (The dots were added to improve stereopsis, thereby ensuring that the background behind the black stimulus card would be seen accurately in depth.) The central green figures were constructed by cutting out shapes from green cardboard and pasting them on a black square background card. All test displays consisted of just the inner green regions presented for 1 second each on a computer monitor against the white surround of the entire screen.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 except that the unambiguous presentation and testing conditions eliminated the need for organizational instructions in both the learning and the test phases. In other words, the central object displays replaced the "inside" instructions and the central hole displays replaced the "outside" instructions during the initial learning phase of the experiment. Observers were likewise not instructed to view the test figures as objects because they were presented simply as the inner green figures against the large white surround of the entire screen, which people normally interpret as figures against a surrounding ground.
Results
The results paralleled those of Experiment 2 in all important respects (see Figure 5 ). Memory performance was somewhat lower overall than in Experiment 2, but this might be due simply to the more substantial differences between the initial learning displays (3-D physical objects in depth) and the later recognition displays (2-D computer generated images) in Experiment 3 relative to Experiment 2, in which all displays were computer generated images. The figural region of the object displays, in which the central green region occluded the black background, were recognized 81% of the time in the testing phase, whereas the ground region in the hole displays, in which in the surrounding black region revealed the green background in the center, were recognized 78% of the time. The small difference between these two recognition rates was not statistically reliable. The false positive rate to new (distracter) displays was 28%, yielding d' values of 1.46 and 1.35 for the object and hole conditions, respectively, both of which are well above chance.
These findings indicate that the reason for the lack of a reliable difference between the instructional conditions in Experiment 2 is not due to observers' inability to follow the instructions. The most plausible interpretation is that when observers perceive a surface containing a hole, their perception and memory include a description of the shape of the hole that is very similar, if not identical, to the shape of its solid complement.
General Discussion
Some readers have objected to our conclusion that people remember the shapes of holes by claiming that it is based on a null effect, pointing to the lack of significant differences between memory for holes versus memory for solid objects. There may indeed be a small difference between people's memory for the shapes of holes versus objects that would reach statistical significance with enough additional observers, but this objection completely misses the hole (!) point of the experiments. A straightforward application of the classical figure-ground framework to nested displays predicts no memory for the shapes of holes, and this prediction was supported by Rubin's (1921) original findings.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3, however, argue strongly against this hypothesis and appear to contradict Rubin's results because they show not only good memory for the shapes of holes, significantly exceeding that for distracters, but memory that is not reliably worse than that for the shapes of objects.
Other readers have objected to our conclusion by arguing that the prediction of no memory for the shapes of holes is a "straw man." However, the results of Experiment 1 clearly establish that there is indeed no measurable memory for the shapes of ground regions in unnested bipartite displays when no holes are present. By simple extrapolation to nested displays, this implies that there should be no memory for the shapes of holes, consistent with Rubin's (1921) original results. We maintain that this is simply untrue in the general case: People do remember the shapes of holes. The crucial question is: Why?
The answer we favor is very simple: The shape of an (intrinsic) hole in a surface is encoded as an integral part of the representation of the hole-bearing surface. (For related claims, see Casati & Varzi, 1994; Palmer, 1999, p. 286-287; Peterson, 2003) . For instance, the circular shape of the hole in Figure 2A is perceived because the shape of that hole-bearing surface is represented as something structurally analogous to the linguistic description, "A black square with a circular hole at its center." In this view, the description of the object containing a circular hole includes a representation of the shape of the hole in much the same way that the description of an object containing a circular part would include a representation of the shape of that part. If the to-be-remembered-object were a black square with a gray circle attached to its center, for example, nobody would be surprised if the shape of the circular part were perceived and remembered. It is the same, we believe, with the shapes of holes. The only difference is that the circularity of the part is the shape of a material part, whereas the circularity of the hole is the shape of an immaterial part (cf., Casati & Varzi, 1994; Peterson, 2003) .
We conceive of an "immaterial" or "virtual" surface as a purely geometrical entity that signals where a surface is, in effect, completely and utterly invisible, like a perfectly transparent window, due to the lack of physical material. As a theoretical framework, it has several desirable properties beyond the fact that it is consistent with our findings. First, it gives the shape of the hole a referent independent of the background surface that is visible through it. The circularity of the hole in Figure 2A , for example, does not in any sense impart circularity to the striped surface behind the hole, because the striped background surface is clearly perceived to extend behind and beyond the aperture. Rather, it is the aperture itself -the absence of material in the middle --that is circular. Second, this scheme properly positions the hole at the depth of the surface from which it is missing rather than at the depth of the ground surface visible through it. Linguistically, one describes the ground as "lying behind the hole" and as "being visible through the hole." One also usually says, "The hole is in the object (or surface)," and never, "The hole is behind the object." All of these verbal descriptions imply that the hole is a perceived, though immaterial, entity that is spatially continuous with the hole-bearing surface and closer to the viewer than the partly visible ground surface.
Interestingly, this relatively simple, straightforward account of perceiving and remembering the shape of an intrinsic hole does not actually appear to require rejecting the classical figure-ground doctrine --namely, that relative depth and figural shape are inextricably linked --provided that "figural shape" is clearly and unambiguously identified with the determination of local, material convexities and concavities (which one might more accurately call "material shape") rather than with the global shape that is phenomenally perceived under most circumstances. Relative depth across an edge and material shape of the figure must be consistent, because the material side of an edge is, by definition, the closer side, and material convexities and concavities must therefore be defined with respect to the closer side.
These linked outcomes clearly could result from a single, unidirectional process of edge assignment.
Once such determinations about the material edges have been made, however, we believe that there is a further process of global shape description which gives rise to the difference we find between people's memory for the shape of intrinsic holes in nested displays (in Experiments 2 and 3) versus standard grounds in bipartite displays (Experiment 1). When the display consists of non-nested, bipartite displays, the material shape will be entirely consistent with the perceived global shape. When it consists of two nested regions, where one is perceived as a hole, then the material shape is the compliment of the perceived shape of the hole, with all convexities and concavities exactly reversed.
The present account thus implies an important dissociation between an early process of figure- ground organization, including relative depth across an edge and local convexities and concavities of shape, and a later process of global shape description. We believe that there is already evidence for just this dissociation from experiments on reference frame effects in figure-ground organization versus those on explicit memory for object shape. In a series of classic experiments, Rock (1973) showed that the perceived and remembered shapes of objects are represented within a gravitational and/or environmental frame of reference rather than a retinal one. He did so by having observers view novel, relatively amorphous 2D shapes in an initial learning phase and in a later recognition memory phase with their heads either upright or tilted at various angles during the two phases of the experiment. The results showed that, under these conditions, perceived and remembered shapes are encoded relative to environmental orientation rather than retinal orientation.
More recently, Vecera (2005) performed similar experiments to determine the reference frame that governs the figure-ground cue of lower region (Vecera, et al., 2002) . Surprisingly, he found the opposite result: The lower region cue for figure-ground organization is clearly governed by retinal/head orientation rather than environmental orientation. The same result results for the figure-ground cue of top-bottom polarity: there is a perceptual bias toward the regions that are wider at their "bottom" as defined by retinal coordinates (Thierman, Vecera, & Palmer, 2006) . The most plausible interpretation of these results is that figure-ground organization occurs prior to orientation constancy and is based on retinal/head orientation, whereas explicit shape description occurs after both figure-ground organization and orientation constancy and is based on environmental/gravitational orientation . This constellation of results supports the present claim that basic figure-ground organization processing of edge assignment occurs before the representation of global shape, such as presumably underlies performance in the recognition memory paradigms used by Rock (1973) and in the present experiments.
A further issue is why the shapes of intrinsic holes in this later process of global shape description are recognizable from their solid complements, which is how we tested them. The key question here is: How does the visual system represent the shape of the closed contour that defines an intrinsic hole? At least two qualitatively different schemes seem possible, one based on encoding the shape of the material surface directly and the other on encoding it indirectly via encoding the shape of the immaterial hole.
The direct way, which we will call the "material surface scheme" is that the shape of a hole might be represented in terms of the configuration of material convexities and concavities relative to the closer side, which is the outside of the contour. By this scheme, the inner contour of the hole-bearing object depicted in Figure 6A would be locally convex over the majority of its perimeter, consisting of a series of large, smooth bulges inward toward the center from the material ring that comprises the object, separated by a series of relatively small, but deep concavities toward the material ring. The inner contour of Figure   6B , in contrast, would be locally concave over the majority of its perimeter, consisting of a series of broad, smooth indentations in the material ring, separated by a series of small, sharp, convexities pointing in toward the center from the material ring. This material surface scheme is presumably the basis on which one would predict that the shape of the hole would not be perceived or remembered when tested with its solid complement, because the description the hole would receive would not be the same as that of its solid complement (see Figures 6C and 6D ). If this were the case, then memory for the shape of a hole in a surface should not be remembered any better than the shape of the ground in a standard bipartite figureground display (see Figure 1) , which was essentially at chance in Experiment 1. Experiments 2 and 3 show that this is clearly not the case, however: The shapes of intrinsic holes are remembered no worse than their solid complements when tested with those solid complements, and they are remembered much better than chance. These facts lead us to reject this hypothesis about the representation of the global shape of intrinsic holes, at least for the present task of remembering the shapes of hole-bearing objects.
This material surface scheme is still fully useful in representing the shapes of standard objects without holes, however.
Another way to represent the shape of a surface with an intrinsic hole, which we will call the "immaterial surface scheme," is simply to encode the shape of the material surface together with the shape of the immaterial surface that constitutes the hole, but with a symbolic indication that it is "empty" or "missing." In other words, the shape of a hole can be represented in the same way as that of its solid complement (i.e., with concavities and convexities defined relative to the inside of the contour), but with a symbolic "empty tag" indicating that it represents the shape of the absence (rather than the presence) of material at the designated location. Note that such a shape description would necessarily only occur after edge assignment had taken place, because only then would the system be able to determine that the "empty tag" was needed to indicate that the presence of an intrinsic hole. In this scheme, the shape of the hole in Figure 6A would be perceived and remembered as largely concave and "spiky," as would its solid complement shown in Figure 6C , and the shape of the hole in Figure 6B would be perceived and remembered as largely convex and "smooth," as would its solid complement in Figure 6D .
An analogy to a minus sign in mathematics may help clarify the nature of this immaterial surface scheme. Representing the shapes of holes in this way is analogous to representing negative numbers in the same way as positive numbers, but with a minus sign to indicate the complementary relation between the negative number and its positive counterpart: i.e., they sum to zero. This scheme makes corresponding negative and positive numbers, somewhat paradoxically, both extremely similar and diametrically opposite. In like fashion, the "empty tag" would be part of a representation of the shape of the inner contour to indicate the absence of material in the hole of an otherwise solid surface (or, equivalently, the presence of an immaterial portion of an otherwise solid surface). It would thus signify both the strong shape similarity between such a hole and its solid complement and the fact that they are, in one particular sense, completely opposite. For some purposes it would be an extremely useful way to encode the shape of a hole, because the same shape description without the empty-tag represents the shape of the solid object that would exactly fill the hole. Imagine, for example, how difficult it would be to do a jigsaw puzzle if the perceived shapes of unfilled holes did not somehow match the perceived shapes of the pieces needed to fill them! This immaterial surface scheme is at least one coherent basis on which one could account for the fact that the shapes of intrinsic holes are remembered well when their solid complements are presented in a shape recognition test. The hole is simply the "empty" part and is encoded in a form equivalent to the solid complement except for the hypothesized "missing tag."
The immaterial surface approach to the representation of hole perception appears to be consistent with the results of the present experiments but is probably not the whole story. Whether the visual system uses the immaterial or material approach to encode hole shape may depend on both the characteristics of the intrinsic hole and the task in which the observer is engaged. Suppose, as SubiranaVilanova and Richards (1996) suggested, that observers are examining holes, such as those depicted in Figures 6A and 6B , for the purpose of reaching through them with their hands, so that whether the material edges are pointy and dangerous or smooth and harmless becomes the crucial consideration.
Here it is the properties of the material surface surrounding the hole that is important, so one might expect the coding of hole shape to conform to the material surface scheme. If so, the results of a subsequent recognition memory task might differ from those we have reported in the present experiments. Similarly, there might be task-dependent considerations that bias the visual system to encode shape according to the material or the immaterial strategies. Large surfaces with small holes, for example, might be more likely to lead to the immaterial scheme, and small surfaces with large holes might be more likely to lead to the material scheme. Such matters remain to be investigated.
The present experiments provide convincing evidence that the shapes of standard ground regions in unnested displays are not remembered, but those of intrinsic holes in nested displays are. We have speculated about a theoretical approach to representing hole shape that seems promising in accounting for our results, based on the hypothesis that the visual system constructs shape descriptions of holes as immaterial parts, but we have stopped short of proposing any specific mechanisms by which such descriptions would actually be constructed. Perhaps a process theory consistent with these proposals will be able to explain not only the present results, but how and why they differ from other recent findings that have shown the shapes of holes to be processed differently than the shapes of solid objects in online perceptual tasks. It is not difficult to imagine that more complex processing might be required to construct the description of an intrinsic hole than its solid complement, for example, and/or that this might slow visual search for holes relative to objects, as Hulleman and Humphreys (2005) reported. It is also conceivable that Bertamini's task (e.g., Bertamini & Croucher, 2003; Bertamini & Mosca, 2004 ) might be performed on the representation of piecewise material convexities and concavities before any global shape description is constructed, in which case his results would not conflict with the present ones. A viable process theory of hole perception will not be easy to construct, however, as it must address many questions that lie at the intersection of several poorly integrated domains, including figureground organization, depth perception, shape perception, visual attention, and visual memory, all of which appear to play a role in the present task. Even so, the perception of and memory for visual holes appear to be a promising arena in which to address these difficult, but important and closely related problems.
Footnotes 1
Occasionally, a shared contour can be assigned to both regions at once in a so-called "mosaic"
organization, as when two jigsaw pieces fit precisely together. This case is seldom experienced, however, unless there is visual evidence supporting it, such as the presence of a double contour or two adjacent extremal edges (Palmer & Ghose, 2006; Gillam, in press ). We will not consider this case further in this article, concentrating exclusively on the more usual case of figure-ground organization.
2 Depth edges are occluding contours that arise from a discontinuity in depth between the environmental surfaces across the two sides of the edge. Depth edges are typically contrasted with three other types of edges that do not involve occlusion : reflectance edges due to changes in the reflectance properties of material across the edge (e.g., from different paint), illumination edges due to changes in the amount of light falling on the two sides (e.g., from shadows or specular highlights), and orientation edges due to abrupt changes in the orientation of a environmental surfaces without a depth discontinuity (e.g., along a dihedral angle).
3
We mean to distinguish between visual holes, which are defined for closed regions in 2D optical images, and physical holes, which are defined for the distribution of matter in 3D space. There are, of course, important relations between them, but they are far from simple. Some physical holes cannot be seen at all, such as the hole inside a basketball. Other physical holes are only partial, such as a hole in the ground. (The reader is referred to Casati and Varzi (1994) for an excellent and extended discussion of typologies of holes.) We do not attempt to account for the visual perception of all physical holes, but restrict our attention to visual holes. Moreover, from this point on, we will generally simplify the analysis further by limiting our discussion to images of flat 2D surfaces that are perpendicular to the line of sight, unless otherwise indicated.
4
We do not wish to imply that perceptual processes and memory are always identical. There is, however, a historical precedent in using memory tasks to infer perceptual processes (e.g., Rock, 1973; Rock & DiVita, 1987; Rock & Engelstein, 1959) under the assumption that in most circumstances what is remembered is what was previously perceived. There remains a possibility that memory performance in our experiments is affected by an intention to remember particular aspects of the stimulus, and we are currently investigating this in further studies using instructional manipulations. While our theoretical position would also be strengthened by convergent results in an analogous perceptual task, it is important to note that this could also be affected by the intentions of the participant.
5
The "adjacent interior point" refers to the point inside the contour that is closest to the given contour point along the direction perpendicular to the contour tangent at that point.
6
Intrinsic visual holes thus do not include "accidental" visual holes that arise when two or more objects are viewed from a stationary point such that their contours happen to coincide, forming a visual hole in which there is a depth discontinuity along the hole's boundary at the points where it projection "jumps" from one object to another. For a treatment of this type of hole, see Nelson, Thierman, & Palmer (in preparation) .
7
The shape of the complement is, in a particular mathematical sense, the opposite of the hole's, because at each point along the contour, convexities are replaced by their complementary concavities, and concavities by their complementary convexities, such that the sum of the signed curvatures on the two sides of the contour at each point is exactly zero. Although the complement of a 3D hole might be ambiguous, because the position of the "surface" within the hole is ill-defined, the complement of a hole in a flat 2D surface is not, because the surface is defined as either present or absent for every point in its plane. 
